Held vicariously liable for a disability organization's protected speech — on a different candidate's post, about a different race — while the code simultaneously banned him from controlling that speech.
Jack Derby filed a complaint alleging that Yelkovan violated Section 44(a) — the same vague "civility" clause used in Case 24, but now applied in a completely different context.
The complaint centered on comments made by the Blind Snakes Co-Op, a disability justice student organization, under their own Instagram post. The comments were directed at a candidate in an entirely different race — the presidential race — questioning that candidate's record on disability advocacy.
Derby's theory rested on an endorsement agreement Yelkovan had signed. Within it, candidates agreed to "also take responsibility for any violations the RSO engages in surrounding the election and when promoting my campaign as outlined in the AS Election Code."
The problem: the comments had nothing to do with Yelkovan's campaign or his race. A disability advocacy organization was independently commenting on a presidential candidate's disability record. This was not "promoting" Yelkovan's campaign.
This is where the logic collapses entirely.
Section 43K(1) of the Election Code prohibits candidates from "planning, distributing, and producing campaign materials, sharing campaign funds and resources, or engaging in collective marketing" with organizations.
The endorsement agreement held Yelkovan liable for the organization's speech.
Section 43K(1) barred him from controlling that speech.
Result: Yelkovan was punished for not doing something he was legally prohibited from doing. Compliance was structurally impossible.
Yelkovan's team presented multiple arguments:
The Electoral Commission found Yelkovan guilty in a unanimous 7-0 vote. This was the third strike — triggering automatic disqualification.
Yelkovan appealed to the Judicial Board. The appeal was denied without a hearing.
The Judicial Board's denial letter was signed "AS Elections Board" — the name of the body that prosecuted the case, not the one reviewing it.
When challenged, the Board called it "a sincere mistake" and claimed they had "seen many cases today." But the error reveals a concerning lack of institutional separation between prosecutor and appellate reviewer.
Yelkovan's team responded with a detailed rebuttal pointing out the constitutional violations and the logical impossibility of the ruling. The Judicial Board's final response was:
By declining to review whether the governing documents themselves were constitutionally applied, the Judicial Board abdicated its oversight role. The appellate process became a rubber stamp.
Yelkovan filed a second, more detailed appeal brief citing extensive case law:
The appeal argued that the Board's earlier denial was not "binding" under Judicial Rules, as only decisions from actual cases are binding — not decisions on whether to hear a case. The outcome of this second appeal is part of the ongoing situation.
If this standard were applied consistently, no endorsing organization could ever publicly question any candidate's record — because its endorsed candidate would be held responsible. Disability advocates couldn't advocate. Political organizations couldn't organize. The ruling silences not just the candidate, but entire communities.
This is core political speech: a disability advocacy organization commenting on a candidate's qualifications regarding disability issues. It is precisely the type of expression the First Amendment most strongly protects. No amount of election code language can override constitutional protections at a public university.
A candidate cannot simultaneously be required to prevent an organization's speech AND be prohibited from controlling that organization's speech. The Election Code, as applied, made compliance impossible by design.